二进制漏洞分析-1.华为Security Hypervisor漏洞

二进制漏洞分析-2.揭示华为安全管理程序(上)

二进制漏洞分析-3.揭示华为安全管理程序(下)

二进制漏洞分析-4.华为安全监控漏洞(SMC SE 工厂检查 OOB 访问)

二进制漏洞分析-5.华为安全监控漏洞(SMC MNTN OOB 访问)

二进制漏洞分析-6.Parallels Desktop Toolgate 漏洞

二进制漏洞分析-7.华为TrustZone Vsim_Sw漏洞

二进制漏洞分析-8.Huawei TrustZone VprTa漏洞

二进制漏洞分析-9.华为TrustZone TEE_Weaver漏洞

二进制漏洞分析-10.华为TrustZone TEE_SERVICE_VOICE_REC漏洞

二进制漏洞分析-11.华为TrustZone TEE_SERVICE_MULTIDRM漏洞(上)

二进制漏洞分析-11.华为TrustZone TEE_SERVICE_MULTIDRM漏洞(上)

二进制漏洞分析-12.华为TrustZone TEE_SERVICE_MULTIDRM漏洞(下)

二进制漏洞分析-13.华为TrustZone TEE_SERVICE_FACE_REC漏洞(一)

参数 OOB 访问FI_onExec¶

在函数（如前所述）中，即使 TEE 参数类型正确，也不会检查输入缓冲区的大小。因此，如果缓冲区小于预期，则可以进行 OOB 访问。FI_onExecparams[1]

int FI_onExec(
        unsigned int commandID,
        void *buffer1,
        unsigned int length1,
        void *buffer2,
        unsigned int length2,
        uint32_t paramTypes) {
    // ...
    switch (commandID) {
        case 0x80013:
            // ...
            image_info.width = ((uint32_t *)buffer1)[0x12C01];
            // ...
        case 0x80014:
            // ...
            image_info.width = ((uint32_t *)buffer1)[0x380];
            // ...
        case 0x80015:
            // ...
            image_info.width = ((uint32_t *)buffer1)[0x12C01];
            // ...
        case 0x80016u:
            // ...
            image_info.width = ((uint32_t *)buffer1)[0x12C01];
            // ...
    }
    // ...

例如，在代码处理命令0x80013中，将值从偏移0x4b004提取到此缓冲区中，如果缓冲区小于此偏移量，则会导致崩溃。可以使用概念验证代码来触发此 bug：

[HM] [ERROR][2171]vmem_as_ondemand_prepare failed
[HM] [ERROR][2496]process 1d00000028 (tid: 40) data abort: 
[HM] [ERROR][2498]Bad memory access on address: 0x7004e004, fault_code: 0x92000007
[HM] 
[HM] Dump task states for tcb
[HM] ----------
[HM]     name=[TEE_SERVICE_FAC] tid=40 is-idle=0 is-curr=0
[HM]     state=BLOCKED@MEMFAULT sched.pol=0 prio=46 queued=1
[HM]     aff[0]=ff
[HM]     flags=1000 smc-switch=0 ca=7022 prefer-ca=7022
[HM] Registers dump:
[HM] ----------
[HM] 32 bits userspace stack dump:
[HM] ----------
[HM] <_Z9FI_onExecjPvjS_j+0x420/0x9e4>
[HM] <_Z9FI_onExecjPvjS_j>+0x4e4/0x9e4
[HM] <TA_InvokeCommandEntryPoint>+0x4a0/0x8e8
[HM] <tee_task_entry>+0x398/0xcd4
[HM] Dump task states END
[HM] 

空指针取消引用MsgController::_sendMsg¶

要与 trustlet 异步交互，CA 可以注册一个代理，该代理可以等待事件并发送响应。可以设置此通信通道：

• 在 NWd 端使用 ioctlTC_NS_CLIENT_IOCTL_REGISTER_AGENT;

• 在 SWd 端使用命令 （#ID 0x17）。HandlePrepareAgentCommand

如下图所示，最终从库中调用函数。HandlePrepareAgentCommandFI_prepare4Agentlib_faceidalgo

uint32_t HandlePrepareAgentCommand(uint32_t paramTypes, TEE_Param params[4]) {
    // [...]
    ret = FR_TA_PrepareAgent();
    // [...]
}

uint32_t FR_TA_PrepareAgent() {
    // [...]
    g_algo_api->FI_prepare4Agent()
    // [...]
}

FI_prepare4Agent调用。然后，此函数调用该函数，该函数将启动一个线程循环，该循环可以根据对象中设置的消息代码接收和发送响应。FaceIdCore::prepare4AgentMsgController::threadLoopthis->msgCodeMsgController

uint32_t FI_prepare4Agent() {
    // [...]
    FaceIdCore::prepare4Agent(g_faceid_core);
    // [...]
}

uint32_t FaceIdCore::prepare4Agent(FaceIdCore *this) {
    // [...]
    MsgController = MsgController::getMsgController();
    MsgController::threadLoop(MsgController);
    // [...]
}

uint32_t MsgController::threadLoop(MsgController *this) {
    // [...]
    MsgController::agentLock(this);
    // [...]
    do {
        MsgController::wait4Send(this);
        // [...]
        switch (this->msgCode) {
            // [...]
            // Handler called in function of msgCode
            // [...]
        }
    } while (!this->field_60);
    // [...]
}

在 NWd 端的初始化过程中，将提供通过共享内存分配的代理缓冲区。在调用 期间，将检索此缓冲区并将其映射到 SWd 中，该缓冲区使用函数 进行设置。MsgController::agentLockthis->agentBufferTEE_EXT_GetAgentBuffer

uint32_t MsgController::agentLock(MsgController *this) {
    // [...]
    result = TEE_EXT_GetAgentBuffer(this->agentId, &this->agentBuffer,
        &this->agentBufsize);
    // [...]
}

相反，可以使用命令 （ID #0x11） 从对象中删除代理缓冲区。此处理程序将调用库中的函数，该函数最终调用 .MsgControllerHandleDynamicUnloadCommandFI_dynamicFinilib_faceidalgoMsgController::deInit

uint32_t HandleDynamicUnloadCommand(uint32_t paramTypes, TEE_Param params[4]) {
    // [...]
    ret = FR_TA_Finish();
    // [...]
}

uint32_t FR_TA_Finish() {
    // [...]
    g_algo_api->FI_dynamicFini();
    // [...]
}

int FI_dynamicFini() {
    // [...]
    return FaceIdCore::deinit(g_faceid_core);
    // [...]
}

int FaceIdCore::deinit(FaceIdCore *this) {
    // [...]
    msg_controller = MsgController::getMsgController();
    // [...]
    MsgController::deInit(msg_controller);
    // [...]
}

MsgController *MsgController::deInit(MsgController *this) {
    this->sysfuncs = 0;
    this->agentBuffer = 0;
    this->agentBufsize = 0;
    return this;
}

但是，可以设置为 0，然后让 trustlet 使用它而不进行任何检查。例如，我们可以拼出命令的执行流程 （#ID 0x10），并看到它即使在被删除后也使用代理缓冲区。this->agentBufferHandleDynamicInitCommand

HandleDynamicInitCommand首先调用库中的函数，该函数使用 设置为 0x12 的函数向消息控制器发送消息。FI_dynamicInitlib_faceidalgoMsgController::sendmsgCode

uint32_t HandleDynamicInitCommand(uint32_t paramTypes, TEE_Param params[4]) {
    // [...]
    ret = FR_TA_DynamicInit(params, paramTypes);
    // [...]
}

uint32_t FR_TA_DynamicInit(TEE_Param *params, int paramTypes) {
    // [...]
    g_algo_api->FI_dynamicInit(
        g_ion_buffers, g_ion_count, iobuf3_addr + 0x10, config_size);
    // [...]
}

uint32_t FI_dynamicInit(FIIonBuf *ionBuffers, int ionCount, void *config,
        uint configSize) {
    // [...]
    FaceIdCore::init(g_faceid_core, ionBuffers, ionCount, config, configSize);
    // [...]
}

uint32_t FaceIdCore::init(FaceIdCore *this, FIIonBuf *ionBuffers, int ionCount,
        void *config, uint configSize) {
    // [...]
    HiAiManager::sendModelInfo2CA(HiAiManager);
    // [...]
}

uint32_t HiAiManager::sendModelInfo2CA(HiAiManager *this) {
    // [...]
    MsgController = MsgController::getMsgController();
    MsgController::sendMsg(MsgController, 0x12, &this->field_C, 0xAA4);
    return 0;
}

int MsgController::sendMsg(MsgController *this, int msgCode, char *msgArg, int msgArgSize) {
    // [...]
    pthread_mutex_lock(&this->field_64);
    this->msgCode = msgCode;
    this->msgArg = msgArg;
    this->msgArgSize = msgArgSize;
    MsgController::send(this);
    pthread_mutex_unlock(&this->field_64);
    return 0;
}

然后接收此消息，并且由于是0x12它将由在默认情况下调用的函数处理。MsgController::threadLoopmsgCodeMsgController::_sendMsg

uint32_t MsgController::threadLoop(MsgController *this) {
    // [...]
    MsgController::agentLock(this);
    // [...]
    do {
        MsgController::wait4Send(this);
        // [...]
        switch (this->msgCode) {
            // [...]
            default:
                MsgController::_sendMsg(this);
                break;
        }
        // [...]
        MsgController::finishNotify(this);
    } while (!this->field_60);
    // [...]
}

但是，此函数将取消引用，该函数在调用之前设置为 0，并将导致 null 指针取消引用。this->agentBufferHandleDynamicInitCommand

uint32_t MsgController::_sendMsg(MsgController *this) {
    // [...]
    *(uint32_t *)this->agentBuffer = this->msgCode;
    // [...]
}

此 bug 可以使用概念验证代码触发，并导致崩溃，因为地址为 0 写入：

[HM] [ERROR][2171]vmem_as_ondemand_prepare failed
[HM] [ERROR][2496]process 1e00000036 (tid: 54) data abort: 
[HM] [ERROR][2498]Bad memory access on address: 0x0, fault_code: 0x92000046
[HM] 
[HM] Dump task states for tcb
[HM] ----------
[HM]     name=[TEE_SERVICE_FAC] tid=54 is-idle=0 is-curr=0
[HM]     state=BLOCKED@MEMFAULT sched.pol=0 prio=46 queued=1
[HM]     aff[0]=ff
[HM]     flags=1000 smc-switch=0 ca=6744 prefer-ca=6744
[HM] Registers dump:
[HM] ----------
[HM] 32 bits userspace stack dump:
[HM] ----------
[HM] <_ZN13MsgController8_sendMsgEv+0x14/0x48>
[HM] <_ZN13MsgController10threadLoopEv>+0x1f0/0x248
[HM] <_ZN13MsgController10threadLoopEv>+0x1f0/0x248
[HM] <_ZN10FaceIdCore13prepare4AgentEv>+0x2c/0xa0
[HM] <_Z16FI_prepare4Agentv>+0x34/0x98
[HM] <TA_InvokeCommandEntryPoint>+0x738/0x8e8
[HM] <tee_task_entry>+0x398/0xcd4
[HM] Dump task states END
[HM] 

Trustlet 函数中的物理地址泄漏FR_TA_CoAuthSignImg¶

函数中存在静态物理地址泄漏。FR_TA_CoAuthSignImg

int FR_TA_CoAuthSignImg(int paramTypes, TEE_Param *params, int nb_params) {
    // ...
    _fr_get_static_phy_addr(&phys_addr, 0, params[1].value.a, params[1].value.b);
    // ...
    tee_print(
        0,
        "%s %10.10s: check phy addr fail phy:%llu offset:%u n",
        "[error]",
        "GetCoAuthImgPhyAddr",
        phys_addr,
        offset);
    // ...
}

Trustlet 函数中的参数指针泄漏FR_GetHwAuthToken¶

函数中存在 TEE 参数指针泄漏。FR_GetHwAuthToken

int HandleGetAuthTokenCommand(uint32_t paramTypes, TEE_Param params[4]) {
    // ...
    FR_GetHwAuthToken(params[1].memref.buffer, &params[1].memref.size);
    // ...
}

int FR_GetHwAuthToken(void *buffer, uint32_t *length_p) {
    // ...
    tee_print(
        0,
        "%s %10.10s: check param fail, token 0x%x, len 0x%x n",
        "[error]",
        "FR_GetHwAuthToken",
        buffer,
        length_p);
    // ...
}

Trustlet 函数中的参数指针泄漏FR_ActiveUserSet¶

函数中存在 TEE Param 指针泄漏。FR_ActiveUserSet

int HandleActiveUserSetCommand(uint32_t paramTypes, TEE_Param params[4]) {
    // ...
    active = FR_ActiveUserSet(params[0].value.a, params[1].memref.buffer, &obuf1_size);
    // ...
}

int FR_ActiveUserSet(int activeid, int *faceids, unsigned int *length) {
    // ...
    tee_print(
        0,
        "%s %10.10s: active user set:param is invalid.activeid:%u,faceids:0x%x,length:0x%x n",
        "[error]",
        "FR_ActiveUserSet",
        activeid,
        faceids,
        length);
    // ...
    tee_print(
        0,
        "%s %10.10s: get face ids fail.ret:0x%x,faceids:0x%x,length:0x%x,length:%u n",
        "[error]",
        "FR_ActiveUserSet",
        DataBase,
        faceids,
        length,
        *length);
    // ...
}

Trustlet 函数中的 ION 虚拟地址泄漏FR_HashCheck¶

函数中映射 ION 缓冲区的虚拟地址泄漏。FR_HashCheck

int HiAiManager::loadModelFromBuffers(HiAiManager *this, FIIonBuf *ionBuffers, int ionCount)
{
    // ...
    npuLoadMemAddr = this->npuLoadMem.vaddr;
    // ...
    HiAiManager::modelBuffShaCheck(this, npuLoadMemAddr, sizeOfBufs);
    // ...
}

int HiAiManager::modelBuffShaCheck(HiAiManager *this, void *npuLoadMemAddr, unsigned int sizeOfBufs) {
    // ...
    return this->sysfuncs->FR_HashCheck(
               npuLoadMemAddr,
               sizeOfBufs,
               &Product::mSha256,
               0x20);
}

int32_t FR_HashCheck(void *model, int modelLen, void *hash, int hashLen) {
    // ...
    tee_print(
        0,
        "%s %10.10s: param invalid,model=0x%x,modelLen=0x%x,hash=0x%x,hashLen=0x%x n",
        "[error]",
        "FR_HashCheck",
        model,
        modelLen,
        hash,
        hashLen);
    // ...
}

Trustlet 函数中的参数指针泄漏FR_GetResultAuthToken¶

函数中存在指针泄漏。TEE_ParamFR_GetResultAuthToken

TEE_Result TA_InvokeCommandEntryPoint(
        void *sessionContext,
        uint32_t commandID,
        uint32_t paramTypes,
        TEE_Param params[4]) {
    // ...
    FR_GetResultAuthToken(params[0].memref.size, params[1].memref.size);
    // ...
}

int FR_GetResultAuthToken(void *buffer, int length) {
    // ...
    tee_print(
        0,
        "%s %10.10s: param is not valid,authtoken = 0x%x, length = %u n",
        "[error]",
        "FR_GetResultAuthToken",
        buffer,
        length);
    // ...
}

Trustlet 函数中的堆指针泄漏FR_LoadDataBase¶

函数中存在堆指针泄漏。FR_LoadDataBase

int FR_LoadDataBase() {
    // ...
    FR_AllocMemToReadFile(v11, fileOps, &loadData, &dataLen);
    // ...
    tee_print(
        0,
        "%s %10.10s: [db_v3] this user has already enrolled faces, and need to restore DB: userId = %u, loadData = %p, dataLen = %u n",
        "[info]",
        "FR_AllocMemToGetUserInfo",
        ActiveUserId,
        loadData,
        dataLen);
    // ...
}

原文始发于微信公众号（安全狗的自我修养）：二进制漏洞分析-14.华为TrustZone TEE_SERVICE_FACE_REC漏洞(二)